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Market Report
Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 1/4/08
Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb.. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, National Direct
  50 lbs, FOB.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,     
  51-52% Lean.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., Heavy,
  Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
  FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$87.69
115.28
     *
146.26
56.03
     *
63.37
     *
247.67
$92.91
119.77
110.71
148.33
54.38
36.71
59.00
92.25
265.18
$92.97
116.13
100.75
145.08
47.57
47.23
57.21
92.63
262.11
Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.25
3.36
6.33
5.57
2.75
8.82
4.01
10.80
7.12
2.90
8.76
4.49
11.70
7.89
3.33
Hay
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . .
135.00
87.50
82.50
135.00
85.00
       *
135.00
85.00
         *
* No market.
In the September 5, 2007 issue of the Cornhusker
Economics we argued that cap and trade water markets
could significantly reduce the cost of groundwater
allocation. Capping the total amount of water pumped
with an allocation, and then permitting allocating rights
to be traded, reduces control costs because water can
move to where it is most valuable. Irrigators with
inefficient irrigation systems or relatively unproductive
land sell all or part of their allocation rights to irrigators
with more productive operations at a mutually agreed
upon price that makes both parties better off with no
change in total pumping. Subsequent work suggests that
cap and trade markets may be able to increase the
effectiveness of a groundwater allocation program as
well as reduce costs.
In the Republican Basin the objective of groundwater
allocation programs is to reduce the amount of water
consumed by limiting the amount that can be pumped.
Water is consumed when it is lost to the basin through
evaporation, transpiration by plants or other forces.
Water that is pumped, but returned to the aquifer or the
river for later use, is classified as unconsumed. The
effectiveness of a groundwater allocation program is
appropriately measured by the change in consumptive
use which occurs as a result of limiting the amount that
can be pumped. This means that it is important to
consider whether water markets under a cap and trade
policy could change consumptive use, even if the total
amount pumped in the basin remains the same. 
In our analysis of a typical case in the Republican
Basin we found that the impact of a water market on the
effectiveness of allocation policy depended on the size of
the allocation. Markets were found to reduce con-
sumptive use by up to 5 percent for allocations ranging
Figure 1. Changes of Consumptive Water Use: Trading Compared to No-Trading
from about 5 to 13 inches for an illustrative Frontier
County case (Figure 1). At an allocation above 13
inches, a trade would actually increase consumptive use
b e c a use  th e
efficient party
w o u l d  b e
selling water
t h a t  t h e y
o t h e r w i s e
would not pump
to an inefficient
party that would
u s e  i t .  A t
a l l o c a t i o n s
below about 5
inches, trading
also increased
c o n s u m p t i v e
use, but this is
of little concern
from a  policy
p e r s p e c t i v e
because such
low allocations are unlikely to be seriously considered.
 
 What causes consumptive use to decrease with no
change in the total amount pumped when water trading
is allowed? Essentially, trading reduces consumptive
use whenever trading incentives result in moving water
to a well or field where the incremental increase in
consumptive use from applying the transferred water is
less than the consumption which occurred in the
previous use. This would happen for example, if you
had two cases which were identical except for the cost
of pumping. In this case trading incentives would result
in pumping more water from the low cost well and less
from the high cost well.  Consumptive use goes down
from this trade because as the amount of water applied
to a unit of land increases, the proportion that is
consumed decreases. Hence, the reduced consumptive
use from applying less water with the high cost well is
greater than the increased consumptive use from
applying the same amount of additional water through
the low cost well. 
This analysis provides evidence that it may be
possible to use water markets to both reduce the cost
and increase the effectiveness of groundwater
allocations which are designed to reduce consumptive
use. However, policy makers should proceed with
caution because there are circumstances where
consumptive use could increase rather than decrease as
a result of trades which occur under a cap and trade
policy. The most obvious is the case depicted in Figure
1, where at high allocation levels trading increases
consumptive use as water moves from efficient wells
where it is not
n e e d e d  t o
wells where it
i s  n e e d e d .
T h e r e  m a y
a l s o  b e
combinations
of efficiency
and economic
factors which
w e r e  n o t
c o n s i d e r e d
h e r e  t h a t
would result in
t ra d e s  th a t
i n c r e a s e
consumptive
use at the
interm ediate
a l l o c a t i o n
levels. Further research is needed to determine when
market trading would increase and when it would
decrease the effectiveness of allocation policies.  In the
meantime, it is encouraging to observe that cap and trade
water markets may be a more cost effective groundwater
management policy than most observers have suggested.
* These estimates describe results where UNL’s Water Optimizer
was used to optimally allocate water between two fields, one
operated by an Efficient Producer and the other by an Inefficient
Producer in Frontier County. The Efficient Producer was assumed
to produce yields that were 25 percent above average on a fine
textured soil, using a very efficient irrigation system (0.8) with a
water cost of $4 per inch. The Inefficient Producer was assumed
to produce yields that were 25 percent less than average on course
textured soil, using an inefficient irrigation system (0.5) with a
water cost of $8 per inch. 
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